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Abstract
Understanding causal regularities in the world is a key feature of human cognition. However, the extent to which non-
human animals are capable of causal understanding is not well understood. Here, we used the Aesop’s fable paradigm – in
which subjects drop stones into water to raise the water level and obtain an out of reach reward – to assess New Caledonian
crows’ causal understanding of water displacement. We found that crows preferentially dropped stones into a water-filled
tube instead of a sand-filled tube; they dropped sinking objects rather than floating objects; solid objects rather than hollow
objects, and they dropped objects into a tube with a high water level rather than a low one. However, they failed two more
challenging tasks which required them to attend to the width of the tube, and to counter-intuitive causal cues in a U-
shaped apparatus. Our results indicate that New Caledonian crows possess a sophisticated, but incomplete, understanding
of the causal properties of displacement, rivalling that of 5–7 year old children.
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Introduction
As adult humans we are capable of recognising that objects in
the world behave in predictable ways. For example, we know that
two objects cannot occupy the same space, round objects will roll
down hills, and heavy objects sink in water. Many of these
expectations are present very early in life [1,2], whilst others
emerge and evolve over the course of development [3]. It is easy to
imagine that an ability to attend to causal regularities in the world,
and to understand the forces underlying them, would have
adaptive significance for many animal species. Whether animals
do attend to causal regularities has been studied using various
methodologies in different species (for review see [4]). However,
finding comparative tasks to assess how causal information is
processed by different species can be difficult. Existing tasks are
often tied to specific ecologically relevant behaviours such as tool
use (e.g. [5,6]), involve face-to-face interactions with humans [7],
or are too cognitively challenging to be attempted by more than a
select few animals [8].
The most widely used paradigm – the trap-tube task – has been
employed to investigate whether causal understanding underlies
the natural tool-use found in some species of primates [9–13] and
birds [14,15]. In this task, an animal uses a stick to push or pull a
food reward out of a perspex tube, avoiding a visible hole in the
centre of the tube where the food would become trapped. Whilst
trap-tube results have been interpreted comparatively to indicate
differences between the cognitive abilities of great apes and
monkeys [16], and between humans and other animals [9], as well
as similarities between chimpanzees and corvids [17,18], the
capacity of this paradigm to test causal understanding is
undermined by several significant limitations [19]. First, even
slight changes to the task alter performance within a species. Apes,
which predominantly failed standard trap-tube experiments [9–
11], were much more successful when they could pull rather than
push food out of the tube [20], and all subjects passed when they
were not required to use a tool at all [17]. Second, errors made by
animals on a key transfer task, the inverted trap-tube – where the
trap is presented in a non-functional position on the upper surface
of the tube – were also made by adult humans [21], suggesting that
errors on this task cannot confirm an absence of causal
understanding. Third, although the trap-tube has now been made
accessible for non-tool using animals [22], the initial task is still
difficult for most animals to grasp. The majority of subjects tested
either fail or take a long time to perform successfully (e.g. 2 out of 5
chimpanzees passed over 140 trials [10], 3 out of 6 New
Caledonian crows passed over 150 trials [15], and 7 out of 8
rooks passed over 150 trials [18]), thus floor effects preclude its use
with less capable species. With this in mind, it is difficult to argue
that the failures of some animals on aspects of the trap-tube reflect
an absence of causal understanding in that species.
The recently-devised Aesop’s fable paradigm may be a more
informative paradigm for testing causal understanding across a
wide range of species. This paradigm was initially used to test
physical cognition in rooks by Bird & Emery [23], and is based on
Aesop’s well-known tale ‘the Crow and the Pitcher’. In this story a
thirsty crow drops stones into a half-full pitcher of water, raising
the water level in the pitcher until it is high enough for the crow to
drink. In the equivalent experiment subjects are presented with a
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pile of stones and a tube of water containing a floating reward,
such as a worm or meat on a cork. Bird & Emery found that rooks
who had experience of dropping stones [24], but not in the context
of water, would spontaneously drop stones into this water-filled
tube to raise the water level and obtain the reward. This task bears
considerable similarity to the ‘floating peanut’ task, in which apes
and children will spit or pour water into a container to obtain out-
of-reach floating rewards [25,26]. The strength of both these
paradigms lies in their ability to examine the reaction of animals to
novel problems that are not related to the animal’s habitual or
customary tool use behaviours [27].
In subsequent experiments Bird and Emery found that rooks
would preferentially drop large stones than small stones, would
drop stones into water rather than into a tube containing sawdust,
and tended to match the number of stones they dropped to the
level of the water, only reaching into the tube once the worm was
within their grasp. Whilst it shouldn’t be assumed that the rooks
planned their actions in advance [28], this does indicate that the
rooks’ stone-dropping behaviour was goal-directed, with the
intention of obtaining the worm, and that they either understood
or had quickly learnt several causal features of the task; i.e. that
objects must be dropped into a liquid, and that large objects are
more functional than small objects. This paradigm can therefore
be used as a test of causal cognition, investigating whether animals
can understand or learn about various causal regularities which
underlie the displacement of water.
Replications using the Aesop’s fable paradigm with other
species – New Caledonian crows (hereafter NC crows), Eurasian
jays and human children – have confirmed that subjects are more
able to use causal information than arbitrary information to obtain
the reward in these tasks [29–31]. NC crows [31] quickly
discriminated between large and small stones, heavy and light
objects, and water-filled and sand-filled tubes in the causal stone
dropping paradigm. However, they then failed a series of
associative learning controls in which the previously-rewarded
stimuli (large objects and water-filled tubes) now indicated the
location of food in an arbitrary searching paradigm. Similarly,
Cheke and colleagues [30] found that at least one Eurasian jay
performed above chance on all of their causal water-displacement
conditions. However, the jays were not as successful when given
similarly rewarded conditions which followed arbitrary rules. No
birds preferentially dropped stones into a red woodchip tube
instead of a blue woodchip tube (or vice versa) when one of these
tubes was rewarded, suggesting that instrumental conditioning
alone cannot explain the pattern of results. Furthermore, the birds
were less successful when the reward was moved incrementally
towards the bird after each stone drop in a non-causal L-shaped
apparatus. Thus, like NC crows, Eurasian jays used causal cues, in
combination with instrumental learning, to solve the water-
displacement tasks.
In a further experiment of the study by Cheke and colleagues,
jays [30] (and subsequently children [29]) were presented with an
apparatus that made use of counter-intuitive causal cues. Referred
to as the ‘U-Tube’ apparatus, it consisted of a narrow central tube
containing a floating reward, with wider, coloured, tubes
positioned on either side. One of the wider tubes had a concealed
connection to the central tube underneath the table, but the other
did not. Therefore, only stones that were dropped into the wide
outer tube with a concealed connection to the central tube would
raise the water level in the rewarded central tube; adding stones to
the other wide tube that was not connected to the central tube
would not raise the water level. The causal relation in this task was
counter-intuitive: putting a stone into one body of water would
raise the water level in another body of water. Thus, if subjects’
actions were guided largely by a basic understanding of causality
(which could not account for a hidden causal mechanism) their
performance should be selectively impaired on this task (see [30]).
On the other hand, if subjects relied on an associative rule or
simply made quick reactions to perceptual feedback – repeating
certain actions that bring the food closer within reach [28,32] –
they would be able to succeed. Alternatively, subjects could also
pass by using a robust understanding of displacement to posit the
existence of a hidden causal mechanism, that one of the outer
tubes is connected to the central tube, underneath the table,
allowing the displaced water to move between both tubes. If
subjects succeeded on this task, the strategy they used to succeed
could be identified by verbal response (for children), or in follow-
up studies, by revealing the hidden connection, or changing the
colours of the outer tubes.
The majority of eight-year-old children, and some younger
individuals, solved this task. While some older children inferred
the presence of the hidden connection, most succeeded by
identifying which outer tube was the ‘correct’ tube to drop stones
into. Thus, the primary method children used to solve the task was
an associative rule. At all ages, the children’s success rate on the
U-tube task was similar to the other tasks, which followed intuitive
causal rules. In contrast, Eurasian jays selectively failed the
U-tube, suggesting that they struggled to learn a rule that
contradicted their understanding of how the world should work.
Thus, the difficult U-tube task can be used to investigate different
types of reasoning about displacement.
In the current study we used the Aesop’s fable paradigm to
examine causal understanding in NC crows, producing a series of
tasks to tap the extent to which animals can understand or learn
about the causal features of displacement. NC crows are a strong
candidate for understanding this type of causal information. These
birds have exceptional tool manufacturing abilities, routinely
making and using tools in the wild [33–35] as well as in captivity
[5,36]. They attend to functional properties of their tools, such as
length and diameter [37,38], and demonstrate causal understand-
ing in both tool-using [15,39,40] and non-tool using contexts [41].
Previous work using the Aesop’s fable paradigm has hinted that
NC crows may understand the causal features of displacement
[31], but further tests are required to probe the extent of their
understanding.
In a progressive series of tests we replicated past experimental
conditions and then investigated whether these birds would choose
solid instead of hollow objects, narrow rather than wide tubes,
high rather than low water levels, and whether they would succeed
or fail with the causally confusing U-tube task [29,30]. If the birds
fully understood the causal relations involved in displacement they
should recognise that solid objects displace more water than
hollow objects, and preferentially drop solid objects into the tubes.
They also should recognise the effect that changes in magnitude
have on displacement and understand that objects dropped into a
narrow tube will raise the water level by a greater amount than
objects dropped into a wide tube. They should be sensitive to the
starting water levels of different tubes; whilst a narrow tube would
typically be preferable, a wide tube would become the more
efficient option if the starting water level in this tube was
substantially higher than the narrow tube. Finally, a basic
understanding of displacement might impair the crows’ perfor-
mance on the causally confusing U-tube apparatus (as seems to be
the case for Eurasian jays), but rapid associative learning, or an
ability to infer a hidden connection between the outer tube and
rewarded central tube, would enable birds to succeed.
Searching for the signature hallmarks of cognitive mechanisms,
in terms of both when and why animals fail aspects of a task, in
Aesop’s Fable with New Caledonian Crows
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addition to when they succeed, can provide a much richer
understanding of cognition than examining successes alone [42].
Thus, each experiment in our series of tasks was designed to assess
NC crows’ causal understanding of displacement from a slightly
different perspective. In doing this, we could inspect the pattern of
successes and failures across all of the experiments, to gain an
understanding of how these birds solve displacement tasks. To
ensure the birds’ experience could be comparable with previous
experiments a standardised order of tasks was used for all birds.
Six tasks were given in all: (1) water-filled tubes vs. sand-filled
tubes, (2) sinking objects vs. floating objects, (3) solid objects vs.
hollow objects, (4) narrow tubes vs. wide tubes, (5) high water level
vs. low water level in the narrow and wide tubes, and (6) the
counter-intuitive U-tube task.
Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was conducted under approval from the University
of Auckland ethics committee (reference no. R602).
Subjects
Subjects were six wild NC crows, caught and temporarily
housed in a six-cage aviary on Grande-Terre, New Caledonia.
Three of the birds (R, W & Y) were adults and three were sub-
adults (O, RB & WG). Based on sexual size dimorphism [43] two
of the birds (R & Y) were male. Two birds (WG & R) did not
complete all the experiments due to lack of motivation; thus, six
birds took part in Experiments 1 & 2, five birds took part in
Experiments 3 & 4, and four birds took part in Experiments 5 & 6.
Birds were released at their site of capture at the end of this
experiment.
Initial Training
NC crows drop candlenuts on to hard surfaces to break them
[44]. However, they are not known for dropping stones on to
objects in the wild, nor are they known to drop stones into water.
Therefore, before the experiment proper began, the crows were
trained to drop stones into a tube to collapse a platform using a
replica of Bird & Emery’s apparatus [24] (for diagram see Figure
S1).
Birds initially used a stick and inserted it into the tube to
collapse the platform. They were then trained to nudge stones
down the tube, until they would pick up stones from the table to
drop into the apparatus. Once birds had successfully dropped
stones down the tube 10 times, a second apparatus was provided
with a weighted platform which would collapse when multiple
stones were dropped onto it (Figure S1). Birds were given
experience with this apparatus until they obtained the reward
using 2–4 stones on 10 consecutive trials.
General Procedure
Following training birds took part in 6 experiments in which
they dropped objects into water-filled tubes, raising the water level
to obtain a floating out of reach reward. In all cases the reward
was a cube of meat attached to a cork.
First, we established how far each bird could reach into a water-
filled tube with their beak, by presenting floating food rewards at
different water levels. Then, birds were habituated to the task
components. Birds were given a minimum of ten habituation trials
to tubes (taking scraps of meat from the top and base of each tube),
and three to objects (taking meat from under and on top of each
object). Once habituated, birds were given 20 experimental trials
on each of the six tasks, typically in two blocks of 10 trials. Tubes
were pseudo-randomly presented on each side, no more than twice
on one side, and the birds’ choices of objects or tubes were
recorded. Choices were defined as picking up an object from the
table and dropping it into a tube. In some conditions it was
possible for the bird to take inserted objects out of the tube, and
place them back on the table, in which case the number of choices
could be larger than the total number of objects. In experiments
involving two spatially separated tubes (Exps. 1, 4 & 5) birds were
given up to 30 seconds at the beginning of a trial to inspect both
tubes before the stones or objects were placed on the table. Trials
ended when the bird obtained the meat, used all of the objects, or
twice left the table without interacting with the apparatus. Choices
were analysed in terms of the group-level preferences and for each
bird individually using binomial tests, with Bonferroni corrections
to account for multiple tests. Birds were tested in visual isolation in
a separate cage within the aviary. All trials were recorded on
video. For diagrams of each experimental apparatus see Figure 1.
For individual performance data see Data S1.
Specific Procedure and Materials
Experiment 1: Water- vs. Sand-filled tubes. Two clear
Perspex tubes (170 mm high, ID: 40 mm, OD: 50 mm), mounted
onto 3006300 mm Perspex bases, were placed on the table, one
half-filled with water and one half-filled with sand. The water and
sand levels were set at 12 mm below each bird’s reachable height.
Eight stones of similar size, each weighing approximately 15 g,
were arranged in between the two tubes. Each stone would
displace 3–4 mm of water in the water-filled tube, but have no
functional effect in the sand-filled tube.
Experiment 2: Sinking vs. Floating objects. A single
water-filled tube (as used in Exp. 1) was placed on the table. Five
heavy and five light objects of the same size and colour were
arranged, in an alternating pattern, in front of the tube. Heavy
objects were made from rubber (commercially available erasers),
weighed 18 g and would sink to displace 6 mm of water in the
tube. Non-functional light objects were made from polystyrene,
weighed ,1 g, and would float on the surface of the water.
Experiment 3: Solid vs. Hollow objects. A single water-
filled tube was placed on the table with four solid and four hollow
objects (arranged as in Exp. 2). Solid objects were made from of a
cube of fimo modelling clay, with an empty metal cap attached to
the base. Hollow objects were shaped from bended wire, attached
to a metal cap containing a bolt and fimo clay to balance the
weight. Thus both objects were similarly coloured, and were the
same size and weight (15 g), however solid objects would displace
7 mm of water in the tube, whilst hollow objects would displace
only 2 mm.
Experiment 4: Narrow vs. Wide water-filled tubes. Two
differently-sized square tubes (both 170 mm high; attached to
3006300 mm Perspex bases) were placed on the table. The top
surface of the narrow tube had an area of 36 mm2 (inner area:
24 mm2), and the wide tube had an area of 56 mm2 (inner area:
44 mm2). The volume of each tube was equally larger or smaller
than the circular tube used in experiments 1–3. Both tubes were
lidded, with a circular hole in the centre of the lid (D: 24 mm)
through which objects could be dropped. Twelve objects – thin
rubber blocks, 40610610 mm, weighing 9 g each – were
arranged in between the two tubes. These blocks would displace
8 mm of water in the narrow tube, but only 2 mm of water in the
wide tube. The narrow and wide tubes had slightly different
reachable heights as the reward could float further to the side and
out of reach in the wide tube (a difference in reachable height of
0–5 mm depending on reward position). To avoid giving subjects
exposure to this, an additional bird, not otherwise involved in the
Aesop’s Fable with New Caledonian Crows
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experiment, was used to establish the appropriate water level. The
equivalent level for each bird was estimated based on their
reachable heights in the circular tube. The water level for both
tubes was set at 12 mm below the reachable distance for the
narrow tube.
Experiment 5: High vs. Low water-level in Wide & Narrow
water-filled tubes. The materials were identical to those used
in Exp. 4, except that the water levels in the two tubes were not
equal. In the wide tube the water level was set at 6 mm below the
reachable distance for the wide tube for each bird (i.e. ,120 mm);
in the narrow tube it was set consistently at 50 mm. With 50 mm
of water it was impossible to raise the water enough to bring the
food within reach, so the wide tube was the only functional choice.
Experiment 6: U-Tube. The U-tube apparatus was closely
modelled on Cheke and colleagues apparatus used with Eurasian
jays and children [29,30]. It consisted of three tubes, positioned
25 mm apart in the centre of a 4006300 mm opaque Perspex
base. The three tubes extended 170 mm above, and 70 mm below
the base. The two outer tubes (OD 40 mm, ID 30 mm) were un-
baited tubes into which stones could be dropped. The middle tube
(OD 20 mm, ID 14 mm) was baited, but was too narrow for stones
to be dropped into. One of the outer tubes was connected to the
middle tube underneath the base, such that stones dropped into
this tube would raise the water level in both this tube and the
middle tube, bringing the reward within reach. The other tube was
unconnected, so stones dropped into this tube would have no effect
on the water level in the middle tube. As the mechanism was
concealed, to discriminate between the connected and unconnect-
ed outer tubes one was marked with a blue rim and a blue square
around the tube base, the other with a red rim and a red triangle.
For three birds the red triangle marked the connected tube, and
for one bird it marked the unconnected tube. Following
habituation, the reachable height for the middle tube was
established for each bird, and the water level for all three tubes
was set at 12 mm below this level. Eight stones of a similar size,
weighing 12 g, were presented, with 4 stones to the side of each
tube.
Results
Four of the six birds took part in all of the experiments. Two
birds (WG & R) did not complete all experiments due to
diminished motivation. These birds stopped after Experiment 4
and Experiment 2, respectively. Thus, six birds took part in
Experiments 1 & 2, five birds took part in Experiments 3 & 4, and
four birds took part in Experiments 5 & 6. See Movie S1 for an
example trial from each experiment.
Results from each Experiment
Experiment 1: Water- vs. Sand-filled tubes. All birds
dropped significantly more stones into the water-filled tube (76.3%
of stone drops), than the sand-filled tube, across 20 trials (binomial
test, p = 0.001, Figure 2). Individually five out of six birds’
performance reached significance within 15 trials (binomial test,
Figure 1. Diagrams of the apparatus used in each of the 6 experiments. In each experiment birds dropped objects into tubes to obtain an
out of reach food reward. Each experiment involved either a choice of two tubes or a choice of two objects. The apparatus was presented on a table
in the centre of a large testing cage, as pictured. A: Experiment 1, Sand-filled tubes v Water-filled tubes, B: Experiment 2, Sinking v Floating objects, C:
Experiment 3, Solid v Hollow objects, D: Experiment 4, Narrow v Wide tubes, E: Experiment 5, High v Low water levels in Narrow and Wide tubes, F:
Experiment 6, U-tube, a concealed connection links one of the outer tubes with the rewarded central tube.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092895.g001
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p value,0.001), the remaining bird (R) approached significance at
20 trials (binomial test, p = 0.01, ns with a Bonferroni adjusted
alpha level of 0.007).
Experiment 2: Sinking vs. Floating objects. All birds
dropped sinking objects (88.0% of choices) into the water-filled
tube more often than floating objects across 20 trials (binomial test,
p,0.001). One bird (R) picked up and discarded the floating
object 16 times, but never dropped a floating object into the tube.
Across the experiment, birds discarded the floating objects 65% of
the times they picked one of them up, and discarded the sinking
object on 0.02% of pickups, which was significantly different
(paired t-test, t (5) = 6.21, p = 0.002). Individually, all birds
demonstrated a significant preference for the sinking object; four
birds did so within 10 trials and two birds (O & WG) did so within
20 trials (binomial test, p,0.001).
Experiment 3: Solid vs. Hollow objects. All birds dropped
solid objects (89.0% of choices) into the tube more often than
hollow objects, across 20 trials (binomial test, p,0.001). Four of
the five birds reached significant individual performance in eleven
trials or less (binomial test, p,0.001), the remaining bird (W)
reached significance by the 20th trial (binomial test, p = 0.005,
significant with a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.008). No
bird selected a hollow object on their first trial, and two of the five
birds (RB & Y) never dropped a hollow object into the tube. There
was no difference in the proportion of solid and hollow objects
discarded (hollow: 28% of pickups, solid: 0.04% of pickups, paired
t-test, t (4) = 1.75, p = 0.15).
Experiment 4: Narrow vs. Wide water-filled tubes. Birds
did not drop more objects into the more efficient narrow tube
(39.3% of object drops) than the wide tube, in fact in total they
dropped significantly more objects into the wide tube (binomial
test, p,0.001). However, the birds were able to obtain the reward
from both tubes, and they frequently dropped objects only into the
first tube they selected, rather than switching between the two
tubes. On average birds retrieved the reward from the wide tube
after 7 object drops, and from the narrow tube after only 2 drops.
Thus, birds probably dropped more objects into the wide tube
simply because, if they chose this tube first, more objects were
required to obtain the reward. Importantly, on their first object
drop per trial, across 20 trials, birds showed no preference for
either the narrow or wide tube (narrow tube chosen first on 56% of
trials, binomial test, p = 0.27), and individually no bird dropped
significantly more objects into either tube. Birds showed no sign of
developing a preference for the narrow tube over 20 trials (see
Figure 3).
Experiment 5: High vs. Low water-level in Wide & Narrow
water-filled tubes. Across 20 trials all birds dropped more
objects into the wide tube with high water level (86.8% of choices)
than the narrow tube with a non-functional low water level
(binomial test, p,0.001). All birds dropped 3 or more objects into
the narrow tube on their first trial, but then learnt to avoid this
tube (indicated in Figure 3), with each bird reaching significance
individually between trials 6–11 (binomial test, p,0.001).
Experiment 6: U-Tube. All birds performed at chance
levels, dropping on average 48.9% of stones into the connected
tube over 20 trials (binomial test, p = 0.79). They showed no signs
of learning which tube would bring the reward within reach over
the course of the experiment, performing worse in later trials due
to increasing tendencies to side bias and repeatedly drop items into
one tube rather than switching between both tubes (Figure 3). An
inspection of each bird’s individual stone drops (Data S1) did not
reveal any patterns suggesting that birds responded to perceptual-
motor feedback (i.e. repeat actions which bring the food closer,
switch if the action does not).
Discussion
Taken together, the results presented here show that the NC
crows we tested were successful on some, but not all, of the
displacement experiments. In line with previous work [31], they
preferentially dropped stones into water-filled tubes rather than
sand-filled tubes, and they dropped sinking objects more often
than floating objects. This performance is comparable to 5- to 7-
year old children, who learned to pass similar versions of these
tasks over the course of 5 trials [29]. NC crows also attended to the
water level of the tubes, dropping more objects into a tube with a
high rather than low starting water level. Intriguingly, in the
current study NC crows also demonstrated strong preferences to
drop solid objects rather than hollow objects into the water-filled
tubes. This is the first time an understanding of solidity has been
studied in this paradigm, and the fact that NC crows are successful
on this task supports the claim that they have a causal
understanding of displacement. In all experiments in which they
were successful, the birds demonstrated rapid learning.
Before they took part in the water-based experiments, all birds
were trained to drop stones into a Perspex apparatus with a
collapsible platform. Their ability to drop stones and other objects
into the water-filled tubes in the experimental conditions is
therefore not a result of insightful problem solving (unlike [45], for
example). However, during training birds were provided with
natural stones only, they did not have previous experience
dropping light and heavy objects, or solid and hollow objects into
the apparatus, and they did not have experience dropping stones
into sand or water before the experiment began. The birds’
specific preferences for the correct tubes and correct objects in
these four experiments are therefore difficult to explain as the
result of an associative rule learnt during training.
To be comparable with previous experiments [29–31] all birds
received the tasks in a fixed order. Thus, it is possible that
experience with objects and water on the earlier tasks facilitated
the bird’s performance on later tasks. Presenting the experiments
Figure 2. Average performance in all six experiments. Mean
proportion of choices made to the correct option, over 20 trials, in each
experiment. (1: Sand v Water, 2: Sinking v Floating, 3: Solid v Hollow,
4: Narrow v Wide, 5: High v Low water levels, 6: U-tube.) Error bars are
62 SE. * = significantly different from chance (binomial tests,
p,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092895.g002
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in a different order could rule this out; however, given that a
different physical property was relevant in each experiment (i.e.
different substrates, weights, solidities, or volumes of water), prior
experience is unlikely to fully account for success on the four
different tasks.
In contrast to their success on four of the tasks, NC crows did
not differentiate between narrow and wide tubes, nor did they
succeed on the causally confusing U-tube task. As only a small
number of birds took part in this study, we cannot assume this
reflects a species-wide failure. It is notable, however, that all of the
NC crows tested failed these two tasks, whereas all of the NC
crows reached significance, or approached significance (one bird
on one experiment) in the remaining four tasks, indicating that the
U-tube and the narrow vs. wide tubes tasks are considerably
harder for NC crows to pass.
In the narrow and wide tubes experiment, NC crows showed no
preference for the narrow tube on their first object drop per trial,
and overall dropped more objects into the wide tube, rather than
the narrow tube, to obtain the reward. Individually, no bird had a
preference for either tube. It is possible that this lack of success was
because they could not distinguish visually between the two tubes.
However, this seems unlikely as the wide tube was more than
double the size of the narrow tube, and NC crows have excellent
vision [46]. Alternatively, since the birds could eventually retrieve
the reward from either tube, the difference was only one of effort,
and this may have provided insufficient motivation to prefer the
narrow tube. This also seems unlikely in the light of previous work
showing that the NC crows preferred to drop efficient large stones
rather than small stones into tubes [31] and the observation that
some of the crows began to lose motivation towards the end of this
task. If these birds understood the quickest way to access the food,
it is likely that they would have applied this strategy on every trial.
It is intriguing then, that birds passed the solid and hollow
objects condition but failed the narrow and wide tubes, given that
the amount of water displaced was equivalent in both. This result
could have stemmed from differences in the size, proximity or
quantity of the objects and tubes, or it could reflect the difficulty of
recognising that the volume of a tube can be a relevant causal
property, compared to the potentially more salient properties of
solidity or weight. It could also reveal a more general principle: it
may be easier for this tool-using species to recognise the functional
properties of various tools than to recognise the functional
properties of the substrates their tools interact with. In support
of this, although birds passed the sand- vs. water-filled tubes
condition, they made more errors on this task than on either of the
object discrimination tasks. Confirming reasons for the birds’
failure requires further research, but our results do suggest a limit
on NC crows’ understanding of displacement, at least in this
sample. These birds potentially possess a heuristic that ‘objects
dropped into water make the water-level rise’, and can discrim-
inate amongst the different causal properties of these objects;
however, the relationship between tube width and magnitude of
water displacement does not seem to be something these crows are
aware of, or something that they can quickly learn.
The final experiment tested whether NC crows would pass or
fail the causally confusing U-tube task. Success on this task could
be achieved in two distinct ways: (1) at a low level, by relying on
perceptual-motor feedback to repeat actions which bring the
reward incrementally closer[28,32], or by associating one of the
coloured outer tubes with reward, or (2) at a high level, by
inferring a hidden connection between two of the tubes, which
would allow water to pass between them. Children passed this task
reliably from 8 years of age, and individually 4- to 10-year-old
children reported using both of these strategies, but only the low
level rule was statistically related to success [29]. However,
Eurasian jays failed this task [30] despite passing other causally-
consistent tasks, suggesting that a basic understanding of causality
– of how things should work – prevented them from using any other
Figure 3. Changes in mean performance over the course of each experiment. Each panel gives the mean percent correct choices over trials
1–5, trials 6–10, 11–15 and 16–20, in each experiment, to indicate changes in performance over the course of 20 trials. (A: Sand v Water, B: Sinking v
Floating, C: Solid v Hollow, D: Narrow v Wide, E: High v Low water level, F: U-tube.) Error bars are 62 SE.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092895.g003
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information to succeed. The results from the current U-tube
experiment suggest that NC crows are comparable to Eurasian
jays, but differ from human children. NC crows performed at
chance, showing no signs that they could learn the identity of the
correct tube over 20 trials. Thus, they were clearly unable to use a
full understanding of displacement to infer the existence of a
hidden connection, nor could they solve the task using only
perceptual feedback or associative rules. This suggests the
possibility that, like Eurasian jays, the NC crows possess a level
of causal understanding which hindered their performance on this
task with counter-intuitive causal cues.
It is perhaps surprising that birds could not use perceptual-
motor feedback alone to solve the U-tube. NC crows are known
to depend on perceptual-motor feedback to spontaneously solve
string pulling tasks [32,47], based on findings that the perfor-
mance of both experienced and naı¨ve birds is significantly
impaired when visual access to the string is restricted. However,
in an alternative string-pulling paradigm [48] inexperienced
ravens could not solve a counter-intuitive task (where the string
had to be pulled down, to move the reward up), despite the
solution involving a comparable action pattern to a standard
string pulling task. Thus, the findings from the current set of
experiments are consistent with previous work indicating that
corvids struggle to use perceptual-motor feedback to solve
problems which do not follow intuitive causal rules, and support
our suggestion that NC crows used causal cues to pass those tasks
on which they were successful.
There are, however, two explanations for these similar results.
The first possibility, which we are not able to rule out here, is that
birds are less able to use perceptual-motor feedback when they
need to focus their attention on more than one location. For
example, in [48], the string which must be pulled is located above
the perch, and the reward hangs below. In the U-tube, the tube
into which stones can be dropped is separate from the tube which
contains the reward. A difficulty attending to all the relevant
features of the tasks could explain the poor performance of corvids
on the U-tube and the counter-intuitive string pulling problems.
This could also explain the difference in performance of children
and corvids on the U-tube. The U-tube is comparatively much
larger for the birds than for the children, and they must use their
beaks to manipulate the objects. Whereas children could view all
the components of the U-tube simultaneously from a distance, the
birds could not; therefore, attending to perceptual-motor feedback
in this task could have been specifically more difficult for the birds.
Alternatively, corvids may require both intuitive causal informa-
tion and perceptual-motor feedback to pass a task, and fail when
one of these requirements is not met, supported by the series of
stone dropping experiments conducted with Eurasian jays [30].
Given that the NC crows failed the U-tube in the current study, we
should determine whether birds still fail a version of this task when
all the relevant task components are clearly presented within the
birds’ line of sight. This would provide stronger evidence that it is
the counter-intuitive causal information, and not the perceptual
layout of the task, which impairs the birds’ performance.
There are other factors which could have influenced the crows’
performance on the U-tube[49]. Here, the identity of the
connected tube was indicated by an arbitrary cue: red or blue
markers. Although attending to this cue was unnecessary if birds
could rely solely on perceptual-motor feedback, for all other
successful strategies subjects had to associate movement or causal
cues with the arbitrary colour of the tubes, which might have been
easier for the children. Furthermore, the tubes in the U-tube
apparatus were not as spatially separated as in other experiments
(7 cm apart, as opposed to 30 cm apart in Exps. 1, 4 & 5), which
may have made it harder for birds to inhibit unsuccessful actions
towards them (see [49]), or to distinguish between the tubes. The
children’s superior performance could also reflect a fundamental
difference in the cognitive abilities of corvids and humans. Many
successful children inferred a hidden connection between the two
tubes, yet it has been claimed that non-human animals are
incapable of making inferences about unobservable causes [50].
Thus, although NC crows’ are able to reason about hidden causal
agents [41], reasoning about hidden causal mechanisms may be
cognitively beyond corvids’ grasp. Although, alternatively, the
ability to infer the hidden connection could predominantly stem
from children’s prior experience with hidden causes, or with
containers of water, which is likely to greatly exceed the crows’.
We do not yet know if NC crows could pass the U-tube with
modifications to address the limitations above. In particular,
would their performance improve if we presented birds with
spatially separated tubes, brought the locations of the stone drops
and the reward closer together, or modified the use of arbitrary
cues? Equally, we do not know if they could pass this task if the
hidden mechanism was explicitly revealed; i.e. do NC crows
understand, in principle, that dropping stones into a connected
tube could bring a floating reward within reach? Such
experiments could help to pinpoint exactly why birds failed the
U-tube, and indicate whether the birds follow a heuristic such as
‘objects raise the water level’ – suggested by their performance on
the narrow vs. wide task – or whether they can recognise some of
the causal properties underlying the displacement of water in
differently shaped tubes.
Overall, the results of our six experiments suggest that NC
crows do possess a causal understanding of displacement, but this
understanding has limits. The NC crows we tested here could not
respond appropriately to functional differences in the volume of
tubes, nor could they infer the presence of a hidden connection in
the U-tube apparatus. Their ability to select appropriate objects to
drop into tubes, however, was very robust. They reliably
discriminated between sinking and floating objects, and between
solid and hollow objects, selecting the correct option almost 90%
of the time on these tasks. They also preferred to drop objects into
water rather than sand, and into tubes with high rather than low
water levels. Furthermore, their inability to pass the U-tube
suggests that these crows may possess a level of causal
understanding which prevented them from learning rules involv-
ing counter-intuitive causal cues, although this should be
confirmed by further research. The ability to detect and respond
to relevant causal properties demonstrated here, is striking, in spite
of its limits, and rivals that of 5–7 year old children [29].
The Aesop’s Fable paradigm has so far been applied
successfully to understand cognition in rooks, Eurasian jays,
four-ten year old children and NC crows [23,29–31]. However,
to date, although chimpanzees and orangutans have used water
as a tool to raise water level [25,26], their understanding of
displacement in this similar task has not been tested. This method
of studying cognition has strong potential for comparative work
as it does not centre on a behaviour that only some species
perform in the wild. Nor does it require human involvement or
demonstration. Any animal capable of picking up stones could
potentially participate, and – once trained to drop stones – few
trials are required to assess performance. Given that it is unlikely
that any animals drop stones to raise water levels in the wild, this
paradigm can assess to what extent different species demonstrate
an understanding of displacement, without the task having more
ecological relevance for some species than others. To date both
Eurasian jays and NC crows have failed the U-tube, suggesting
that there is a cognitive limit on the level of causal information
Aesop’s Fable with New Caledonian Crows
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processing possible by these species. Whether this limit is
common to corvids, common to birds, or indeed perhaps
common to all non-human animals, is yet to be discovered.
The Aesop’s Fable paradigm can help us answer this, and so help
establish how the ability to process causal information has
evolved across the animal kingdom.
Supporting Information
Data S1 A trial-by-trial record of the choices made by
each bird, for all six experiments.
(XLSX)
Figure S1 Diagrams of the training apparatus. Two
apparatuses were used to train birds to drop stones down tubes. A:
a baited platform – held in place with magnets – would collapse
when a stone was dropped in the tube. B: a pivotal platform – with
hidden counterbalancing weights – would swing downwards when
2–4 stones were dropped down the tube.
(TIF)
Movie S1 Example trials for each of the six experi-
ments.
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